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The Work 
Evans studied at Melbourne University before undertaking DPhil study at Oxford University as a 
Rhodes Scholar, initially under the supervision of Prof Mark Janis, and later Prof Guy Goodwin-
Gill. She returned to Melbourne in 2000, and is currently Dean of Melbourne Law School.  
The monograph focuses on those provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights most 
clearly relevant to freedom of religion: Article 9, and Article 2 of the First Protocol. These 
provisions are placed in context, both in terms of the development of freedom of religion at the 
international level, and in terms of the history of the drafting of the provisions. She then moves 
on to sustained consideration of the key legal issues: defining religion or belief (Chapter 4), 
freedom of religion or belief simpliciter (Chapter 5), manifestation of religion or belief (Chapter 
6), and justifiably limitations on the manifestation of religion or belief (Chapter 7). The text 
concludes with a focus on a particular problem – how to deal with neutral and generally 
applicable laws which impact on religion (Chapter 8), and a brief conclusion (Chapter 9). 
The text is a revised version of Evans’ DPhil thesis. As would be expected of such a work, it was 
far from Evans’ final word on law and religion. She has continued to write on law and religion 
with a particular emphasis on Australian law, and comparative law projects involving Australia 
(Evans, 2015; Evans, 2012a). This has, however, run alongside continued work in the interaction 
of law and religion at the theoretical level (e.g. Evans, 2014), and a sustained contribution to the 
literature on the European Convention on Human Rights (e.g. Evans, 2012b; Evans, 2006a). She 
has also helped to frame the scholarship of others, for instance through editorship of significant 
collections (e.g. Evans, 1999; Evans, 2006b; Evans, 2008).  
The Context 
Carolyn Evans’ Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights was the 
first monograph published in the Oxford ECHR Series. The aim of the series was to provide 
“enough practical detail to be used by practitioners … as well as taking a critical approach to 
past practice”. The series has since closed, but the focus fits well with Evans combination of 
assured, thoughtful, exposition of the primary legal sources of the ECHR, and her critical 
consideration of how the jurisprudence of the ECHR was developing. 
The exposition function was particularly important in a text on freedom of religion or belief. It 
was the first full-length text providing a sustained consideration of freedom of religion under the 
ECHR, as opposed to in international law more generally. In focusing so tightly on the ECHR 
and religion, she was developing the scholarly agenda from Malcolm Evans’ Religious liberty 
and international law in Europe (Evans MD, 1997), as well as the generalist ECHR texts of the 
day.  The text appeared less than a decade after the Court had finally given a full decision on 
Article 9, in Kokkinakis v Greece, and before 9/11 with its consequences for religion cases 
globally. Evans was writing at a time when not only was there comparatively little commentary 
on the ECHR and religion, but the primary legal sources upon which to draw were also 
comparatively small. This led to her placing weight on decisions of the Commission, as well as 
principles derived more broadly from international law, and from a principled approach to 
religious liberty. The theoretical basis for religious freedom is, to Evans, central to the 
development of the Convention: “[u]nless a coherent philosophical justification underlies all the 
cases dealing with Article 9, then the result is likely to be inconsistency and unfairness as the 
judges moves from one rationale to another to justify their intuitions about the right outcomes for 
a particular factual situation” (at 33). She takes some time over the theoretical foundations, 
devoting a wide-ranging chapter to the theoretical rationale for religious freedom, before 
concluding that arguments from autonomy, emphasising dignity and freedom in decision 
making, represent the best approach for the Court in developing the ECHR.  
 The Significance 
The text was well-received on publication, being described as “a clear, sensible and 
appropriately critical account of an important part of Strasbourg human rights jurisprudence” 
(Rivers, 2003), “a careful and thorough analysis” (Moon, 2002), and “replete with insightful 
observations and sound judgment and sensible suggestions and it is surely destined to become a 
standard point of reference on the subject” (Evans MD, 2001). In this brief chapter, we argue that 
the insights, judgment, and in particular suggestions make this monograph particularly important, 
more than its use as a standard point of reference. 
That is not to say that the text has not had an obvious impact on scholars and judges as evidenced 
by citation. Within specialist work on law and religion, this can be seen in texts as diverse as 
P.M. Taylor’s consideration of UN and European law and practice on freedom of religion 
(Taylor, 2005), Trigg’s consideration of the privatization of religion (Trigg, 2007), McCrea’s 
study of religion in the EU (McCrea, 2010), and Temperman’s consideration of religious 
neutrality (Temperman, 2010). Outside of this core audience, the text has been important to two 
scholarly audiences which do not necessarily identify as law and religion specialists. Firstly, 
scholars who work on the topic of religion, but who do not work within a legal frame, and who 
seek to engage with legal ideas of religious rights under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (e.g. Marinovic and Marinovic Jerolimov, 2012; Ipgrave, 2011) Secondly, scholars of 
human rights, and human rights law, who do not have a particular focus on religious rights and 
religious human rights, especially those writing on the UK situation (e.g. Feldman, 2002). The 
text has also been cited by national courts, for instance by the UK Supreme Court in RT 
(Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State of the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38; the Court of Appeal 
in Northern Ireland in Re Parsons [2003] NICA 20; and the Federal Court of Australia in Iliafi v 
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints (2014) 311 ALR 354. 
The greater significance of the text, however, is in Evans’ prefiguring of concerns in the way in 
which the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, then in its very early days in 
relation to freedom of religion, could take the wrong turn. In the current century, the Court has 
returned to these issues repeatedly, gradually overcoming the tremendous reluctance of the Court 
to engage with religious liberty cases as religious liberty cases, and a pattern of closing down 
discussion of religious liberty as quickly as possible even in such cases. In four areas in 
particular Evans identified significant problems with the way in which the jurisprudence may 
develop – areas in which her concerns were, for at least some of the cases decided since her text, 
fully justified by later events. 
The religion or belief rights of atheists and Lautsi. 
An ongoing concern in the text is that under-theorising by the judges means that Article 9 in 
particular lacks an explicit foundation: “unless a coherent philosophical justification underlies all 
the cases dealing with Article 9, then the result is likely to be inconsistency and unfairness as the 
judges move from one rationale to another to justify their intuitions about the right outcomes for 
a particular factual situation” (at 33). It may be argued that one area where the Court has not 
thought through the issues properly is in relation to the Article 9 rights of atheists and agnostics. 
Evans was concerned that the jurisprudence on education in particular was “less sympathetic to 
atheists/agnostics who claim the need to be exempted from religious instruction than to members 
of other religious faiths” (at 95).  
A lack of sympathy, or perhaps better put, a failure of judicial imagination when considering the 
position of atheists within a religious rights regime, materialised in Lautsi v Italy (App. 
30814/06). In that case an atheist parent and children complained at the display of a crucifix in 
the classrooms of the state school attended by the children. Initially, the Chamber found that the 
mandatory display was a violation of Article 2 of the First Protocol taken together with Article 9. 
The Chamber found that the State had an obligation to refrain from imposing beliefs, even 
indirectly, in places such as schools where persons were particularly vulnerable. The crucifix, 
although a complex symbol, had a predominantly religious meaning, so that compulsory display 
of the crucifix not only clashed with the secular convictions of the family, but was also 
emotionally disturbing for non-Christian children. The finding by the Chamber was 
controversial, and as the case proceeded to the Grand Chamber, a significant number of third-
party interveners, including national governments, joined the case. The Grand Chamber took 
quite a different view of the crucifix: there was no evidence that the display of the religious 
symbol “may have an influence on pupils” (para. 66), and the crucifix was “an essentially 
passive symbol … it cannot be deemed to have an influence on pupils comparable to that of 
didactic speech or participation in religious activities” (para. 72). The Grand Chamber noted in 
particular that “Italy opens up the school environment in parallel to other religions”, giving 
examples of non-majority religious practices including Islamic practices (para. 74). While the 
Grand Chamber could see why “pupils who are in favour of secularism may see in the presence 
of crucifixes in the classrooms of the State school they attend an infringement of [their] rights”, 
the Grand Chamber did not agree (para. 78). The Grand Chamber failed, as Evans feared, to be 
fully sympathetic towards the atheists family.  
The nature of manifestation of religion, individual belief, and Eweida. 
A second area of concern identified by Evans relates to the nature of manifestation and the extent 
to which individually held beliefs are protected. She notes that the relatively liberal approach to 
the definition of religion by the Court and Commission was subtly undermined at the 
manifestation stage (at 132) with the requirement that in order to be protected, a practice must be 
necessary to the religion or belief. The requirement can be found in Arrowsmith v UK [1978] 3 
EHRR 218, where a pacifist was prevented from distributing pacifist leaflets to soldiers: the 
Court’s view was that distributing leaflets was not required by her beliefs, and so was not a 
manifestation of her beliefs; thus her right to manifest religion or belief was not infringed.  
The Arrowsmith approach led to a narrowing of the protection potentially offered by Article 9, 
with the result that even serious burdens on religious practice, such as limiting public 
employment, could go unprotected. In effect, questions of proportionality were never reached as 
cases were disposed of at an earlier stage of analysis. As a result, the proper parameters for the 
protection of religion were not fully explored. Evans identified this as a particular problem for 
those with individual beliefs (at 57) that are informal and non-hierarchical, as well as for 
individuals from more formal religions who do not accept all the teachings of the religion, or 
who believe that the religion puts additional demands on them (at 122). Evans suggested that the 
Court could deal more respectfully with the subjective claims of individuals (at 205) to avoid 
undermining the importance of religion or belief, and to allow individuals to create their self-
identity and to live autonomously (at 201).  
Others have echoed this concern (Sandberg, 2011 at 84), and have noted that since Evans was 
writing, the court has softened its approach to the link between religious practice and religious 
requirements somewhat (Knights, 2007)) and allowed a manifestation to be seen where there is 
an intimate link between the practice and the belief. The Court went further in Eweida et al v UK 
[2013] ECHR 37, where a flexible approach was taken to the issue of manifestation of religion, 
saying that there is no requirement on applicants to establish that they were fulfilling a duty 
mandated by the religion in question; instead there could be a manifestation of religion where 
there existed of a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief. 
This acceptance by the Court that the manifestation of religion can include a much wider range 
of activities than those strictly required by religion is very welcome, and avoids some of the 
problems identified by Evans in 2001.  
In addition, the more flexible approach in Eweida also means that a religious practice can 
potentially be protected (e.g. wearing a cross visibly over a uniform) even though the claimant 
has not identified others who share her view that this is essential to the witness of her religion. 
Thus, to a large extent, Evans’ major concerns regarding the narrow interpretation of 
manifestation of religion in Arrowsmith have been allayed by the 2013 decision in Eweida. As a 
result, a significant preliminary barrier to claims under Article 9 has been removed and many 
more religious practices can be viewed as manifestations of religion. This does not lead to 
automatic protection, of course: a manifestation will not be protected, under Article 9(2), if a 
restriction is necessary and proportionate to the achievement of a legitimate aim. However, by 
removing the prior barrier, religion and belief are better protected, as cases no longer fall and the 
first hurdle, and the proportionality of any restrictions on religion can be assessed.  
Article 9(2), the margin of appreciation and SAS v France. 
Although Eweida removed the initial hurdle in making a religion or belief claim, a second hurdle 
is immediately encountered: the margin of appreciation. Evans also noted the use of a wide 
margin of appreciation in religion or belief cases (at 143) as an area of concern, Moreover, she 
noted that the Court and Commission had been too willing to accept reasonably trivial reasons 
for interfering with religious freedom, as well as giving considerable weight to state claims 
involving public order and administrative convenience. (at 207). These concerns seem especially 
prescient in the light of the decision in S.A.S v France (App.43835/11) in 2014.  
In S.A.S v France the ‘rights of others’ was defined even more broadly than in the earlier cases 
noted by Evans. The case involved a significant and far reaching restriction on religion and belief 
by imposing a criminal sanction on the wearing of face coverings or veils in public spaces. The 
ECtHR discounted several legitimate aims that the ban could potentially serve, such as to uphold 
human dignity or gender equality, or to maintain security. However, it concluded that the aim of 
‘living together’ (le “vivre ensemble”) could potentially justify the ban. The decision typifies the 
concern identified by Evans, as it creates space for very broad aims for any restriction on religion 
or belief.  
Of course, even if the legitimate aim is relatively easy to establish, any restriction must also be 
necessary in a democratic society; however, with a wide margin of appreciation in religion and 
belief cases, any protection from the Court may be rather weak. Again, S.A.S v France, is 
illustrative of the problem predicted by Evans: having noted the need for careful consideration of 
the proportionality given the broad nature of the legitimate aim of ‘living together’, the Court 
relied on the margin of appreciation to decide that the ban was proportionate, despite having 
noted earlier that the face veil ban was inconsistent with international human right norms and 
European values and that it was necessary neither to uphold human dignity nor gender equality.  
 
S.A.S v France serves as a useful illustration of the flexibility of the notion of the margin of 
appreciation and the way in which it can undermine the protection available in the ECHR for 
religion and belief. However, the broad use of the margin of appreciation is not only a creation of 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Since Evans was writing, ideas of subsidiarity and the margin of 
appreciation have been put on a more formal basis within the Convention itself, which now 
explicitly refers to the margin of appreciation in Article 1 of Protocol 15 to the Convention. The 
formalisation of the role of the margin of appreciation in the Convention reflects the sensitivity 
of religion and belief matters to member states, and their preference for leaving the setting of the 
parameters for legal protection to national courts, taking into account the national context. The 
effect on the scope of European supervision for human rights remains, with the risk, as Evans 
noted (at 208), that religious vitality and tolerance is undermined.   
 
The definition of religion or belief. 
Evans devoted an entire chapter to definitional issues, and in particular identified the complexity 
of the relationship between “religion or belief” and “thought and conscience” with a clarity 
which has not always been followed through in later discussions of the issue (Ch.4). More 
specifically, she identified concerns that individualised beliefs were not always protected 
because of difficulties of proof (at 57). There has been some solidification of the Courts 
understanding of religion or belief since. In Eweida, for instance, the court cited a line of post-
Evans cases to show that “the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion denotes views 
that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance” (Eweida, at 
para.81).  The same decision stressed the significance of Article 9 as an individual right. The 
importance for individualised beliefs is brought out most clearly by the partly dissenting opinion 
of Bratza and Bjorgvinsson: “to require evidence of group disadvantage will often impose on an 
applicant an excessive burden of demonstrating that persons of the same religion or belief are put 
at a particular disadvantage. This may be especially difficult, as the applicant argues, in the case 
of a religion such as Christianity, which is not prescriptive and which allows for many different 
ways of manifesting commitment to the religion” (at para. 9). The ramifications of this for 
individualised religion have still to be worked out.  
The Legacy  
The political climate regarding religion and belief has changed dramatically since Evans was 
writing in 2001, meaning that it is more important than ever that clarity is achieved in relation to 
the scope of Article 9. At the time that Evans was writing, the case law was just emerging, and 
the issue that was expected to develop in terms of religion or belief in Europe was the role of 
religion in emerging eastern European countries as they negotiated religious freedom after an era 
or religious oppression. Since 2001 the political context has entirely changed and the range of 
issues with which the Court is concerned has grown ever wider. One focus is on Islam in an era 
of heightened security concerns; another focus is on social concerns such as abortion, embryo 
screening, same-sex civil partnership, and religion-related refugee rights, all in a context of an 
increased polarisation in opinion. In the UK context, questions have also emerged regarding the 
state’s commitment to accepting the jurisdiction of the ECHR and its replacement with a British 
Bill of Rights. All this suggests that long after the publication of Freedom of Religion under the 
ECHR the concerns it raised remain subjects of serious interest to legal scholars.  
The text also had a significant impact on how we developed our own work on law and religion 
(for instance Edge, 2006; Vickers, 2016). In particular, while the text would not claim to be 
methodologically innovative, it is methodologically sensitive. It would not have been unusual if 
the text had taken methodogical issues around data collection and data analysis as implicitly 
understood by author and reader, simply a given within doctrinal international legal scholarship. 
Evans did not do this, instead taking time to outline a robust and explicit methodology around 
data collection – even when the data she draws upon is public domain sources of law. This 
thoughtfulness had a strong influence on Edge, particularly as it highlighted to him that doctrinal 
legal scholarship needed to think through methodology in the same way as other forms of legal 
scholarship. Similarly her subtle multi-method, drawing on other forms of scholarship and other 
types of argument to aid her doctrinal project, has influenced us in our later work – the centre of 
gravity for the text is clearly doctrinal international law, but arguments are enriched by her 
consideration of, for instance, the historical context of the provisions drafting.  
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